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I. PDUFA AND ITS CONTROVERSY 
From the 1970s through the early 1990s, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
was heavily criticized for its slow approval process, which the agency in turn blamed 
on its lack of resources.1 As a compromise, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act 
(PDUFA) was passed in 1992 to permit the FDA to charge drug manufacturers a user 
fee for reviewing new drug applications in order to supplement its Congressional 
appropriation.2 Drug manufacturers pay this user fee to have their drug approvals 
reviewed an expedited schedule.3 Initially, PDUFA allowed the fees to be used only 
“to defray increases in the costs of . . . the review of human drug applications.”4 Over 
time, this restraint of using PDUFA fees only as a “supplement” has eroded. By 2015, 
user fees accounted for 42% of the total FDA budget5 and 64% of the FDA drug 
approval process budget.6 For comparison, in 1997, PDUFA user fees only accounted 
                                                          
*J.D., 2016, Yale Law School. Ph.D. biochemistry, 2013, Harvard University. A.B. molecular 
biology & applied mathematics, 2008, Dartmouth College. I would like to thank Professor 
Aaron Kesselheim for discussion and suggestions for this Essay. 
 1  See generally, Ernst R. Berndt, Adrian H.B. Gottschalk, Tomas Philipson & Matthew W. 
Strobeck, Assessing the Impacts of the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts (PDUFA) on the FDA 
Approval Process, in 8 FORUM FOR HEALTH ECONOMICS & POLICY (Dana Goldman ed. 2005). 
 2  PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT (PDUFA), http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/
UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ (last visited March 26, 2016). 
 3  Patrick O'Leary, Funding the FDA: Assessing the User Fee Provisions of the FDA Safety 
and Innovation Act of 2012, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239, 241-42 (2013). 
 4  Pub. L. No. 102-571, § 736(g)(2)(B), 106 Stat. 4491, 4497 (1992). 
 5  FY 2015 OPERATING PLAN NARRATIVE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/U
CM433147.pdf (last accessed Feb. 23, 2015). 
 6  Id.  
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for 8.5% of the total FDA budget.7 This trend has raised questions about conflicts of 
interest as well as the drug approval process’s quality. 
Because PDUFA requires the FDA to respond to drug applications within 10 
months, critics have noted the negative impacts this compressed timeframe could have 
on drug safety.8 For every 10 month of reduced review time, there is a correlated 18% 
increase in serious adverse reactions, 11% increase in hospitalizations, and 7% 
increase in deaths related to an approved drug.9 Even without gloomy empirical data, 
critics argue that this funding mechanism “systematically slants important policy 
choices,” such as under-allocation of monies for post-approval safety surveillance, 
which drug manufacturers prefer not to be burdened with.10 Finally, PDUFA 
opponents argue that its legislative history is replete with re-authorizations, 
extensions, and erosions of FDA independence, including explicitly allowing industry 
members to be on FDA advisory committees, which all point to thorough agency 
capture.11 
However, PDUFA proponents also present compelling counterarguments. Recent 
empirical studies show that there has been “[n]o significant effect of PDUFA . . . on 
the rate of withdrawals of new-drug approvals” when comparing drug safety data 
before and after the Act’s passage.12 Furthermore, proponents argue that “nearly all of 
the decrease in approval times [after the PDUFA passage] would have been achieved 
. . . if the FDA received these funds as direct appropriations rather than relying on 
industry user fees,”13 which makes PDUFA an economically efficient piece of 
legislation for having the drug industry internalize its own costs of safety. 
Furthermore, analytically, FDA bias for specific instances of drug approvals seems 
unlikely, as the “FDA’s decisions on drug applications are functionally independent . 
. . [since] funds from the particular company are not paid directly to any individual 
reviewer or division within the agency.”14 In other words, PDUFA is not a quid pro 
quo; rather, it is a pay-to-play.  
                                                          
 7  Testimony on 1997 FDA Budget Proposal Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural, Rural 
Development, and Related Agencies of the S. Appropriations Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) 
(statement of David A. Kessler, Comm'r of FDA), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960502a.html (last accessed Sept. 1, 2015). 
 8  Donald W. Light, Joel Lexchin & Jonathan J. Darrow, Institutional Corruption of 
Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs, 2013 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 590, 
595. 
 9  Id.  
 10  Marc A. Rodwin, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical Policy, 2013 J. LAW, 
MED. & ETHICS 544, 548. 
 11  James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug 
Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 261, 
294 & 310 fn. 422 (2005). 
 12  Henry Grabowski & Y. Richard Wang, Do Faster Food and Drug Administration Drug 
Reviews Adversely Affect Patient Safety? An Analysis of the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee 
Act, 51 J. L. & ECON. 377, 410 (2008). 
 13  Rochelle Lee, FDA and Drug Safety: New Tufts Study Challenges Critics of the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act, 2006 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 131, 132. 
 14  Id. at 131. 
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Thus, there are strong analytical and empirical arguments supporting both sides of 
this debate. Surprisingly, however, there is little legal analysis on PDUFA. In fact, the 
statute 21 U.S.C. § 379h on the FDA authority to assess user fees has hardly ever been 
litigated. Only three cases have been reported, and none of them challenge the legality 
or discretion of the FDA to charge these user fees, or even question the possible 
conflicts of interest PDUFA may pose.15  
In Part II, I present a legal challenge to PDUFA from an administrative law 
perspective. While I share sympathies with those who believe PDUFA represents an 
unacceptable conflict of interest for the FDA, I posit arguments purely from the 
framework of permissible administrative agency discretion, so as to avoid ambivalent 
analytical and empirical arguments. My argument is that given the statutory and case 
law determinations of permissible federal agency discretion, the FDA cannot assess a 
flat user fee for widely variable types of services it renders during the drug approval 
process. Thus, the current implementation of PDUFA is legally impermissible. 
Subsequently, in Part III, I compare PDUFA to three other agency user-fee 
mechanisms and propose specific improvements to PDFUA to minimize its conflict 
of interest while maintaining its revenue efficiency. 
II. FDA’S OVERREACH 
To start examining PDUFA’s legal issues, one has to ask whether administrative 
law permits user fees to be as prominent of an agency’s budget as PDUFA is for the 
FDA. The answer lies in 31 U.S.C. § 9701(a), which explains that “Congress [intends] 
. . . each service or thing of value provided by an agency . . . to be self-sustaining to 
the extent possible,” and that the agency may “charge for a service or thing of value 
provided by the agency” to meet that self-sustaining goal.16 At first glance, it seems 
that using PDUFA fees to sustain FDA operations is within an agency’s discretion. 
However, the statute further elaborates that the agency discretion on the amount of 
fees to collect is to be based on four factors: equity, cost to the government for the 
service, value to the recipient of the service, and public interest.17 PDUFA fails two of 
these factors: fees charged must be related to the value to the recipient and to the cost 
to the government for the service. 
A. Value to the Recipient 
As a constitutional matter, the Supreme Court held in National Cable Television 
v. FCC that Congress granted federal agencies the power to exact self-sustaining fees, 
but not a power to tax.18 A fee “bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other 
members of society,” whereas a tax theoretically bestows benefits on everyone in 
                                                          
 15  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. HHS, 2014 WL 2171089 
(D.D.C. 2014) was litigated over a question of discounting the user fee for orphan drugs, State-
Trade Inc. v. FDA, 869 F.Supp.2d 95 (D.D.C. 2012) was litigated over a question of whether a 
manufacturer seeking approval of two strengths of same drug should be assessed one user fee, 
and Winston Labs v. Sebelius, 2009 WL 8631071 (N.D. Ill. 2009) was litigated over a question 
of waiving the user fee for small businesses. 
 16  31 U.S.C. § 9701 (a)-(b) (2012). 
 17  Id. at §(c). 
 18  Nat’l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1974). 
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society.19 Thus, the Court held that any user fees charged by a federal agency should 
be scrutinized for and tied to a specific “value to the recipient.”20 In the related Federal 
Power Commission v. New England Power case, the Supreme Court clarified this 
standard by explaining that a federal agency may charge a user fee related to a 
measurable unit of service rendered for a specific recipient, but may not charge a fee 
based on an average from an entire industry, which would be equivalent to taxation.21 
Given these two seminal holdings, the § 9701(b) factor of value to the recipient limits 
agency discretion so that user fees must be charged on the basis of, and intrinsically 
measured by, the benefit received by a specific recipient. 
PDUFA fails to meet this factor because it assesses a flat fee for almost all drug 
manufacturers.22 Despite that, the FDA provides widely varying degrees of evaluation 
and guidance to manufacturers during the drug approval process. For example, drug 
sponsors can request different types of sponsor-FDA meetings;23 additionally, many 
drugs now receive accelerated approvals: in 2012, 56% of all FDA-approved drugs 
had a faster-than-“normal” approval;24 that number rose to 66% for 2014.25 These 
examples all indicate that different drugs’ approvals take up highly variable amounts 
of regulatory attention. Nevertheless, the FDA assesses one flat $2.3 million fee for 
all drug applications, regardless of the services received.26 Therefore, the PDUFA user 
fee is not inherently tied to or measured by the amount of services received by an 
applicant, failing the standard enunciated in National Cable Television.27 
B. Cost to the Government 
The D.C. Circuit in Capital Cities Communications v. FCC explains that the cost 
to the government statutory factor “requires the fee assessed to bear a reasonable 
relationship to the cost of the services rendered [to the agency] . . . . This standard is 
not met where the persons who receive essentially the same physical services from the 
                                                          
 19  Id. at 342. 
 20  Id. at 343. 
 21  Federal Power Commission v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
 22  Cf. Exceptions to Fee Requirements, FDA, available at: http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069943.htm#P112_8652  (last 
accessed Feb. 24, 2015). 
 23  See, e.g., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN THE FDA AND 
SPONSORS OR APPLICANTS, FDA, 5, available at: http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/Guidances/ucm153222.pdf (last accessed Feb. 24, 2014) (“division director or designee 
who receives a meeting request will determine whether to hold the meeting.”). 
 24  Jonathan J. Darrow, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, New FDA Breakthrough-Drug 
Category – Implications for Patients, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1252, 1255 (2014). 
 25  FDA Approving More Drugs, Fighting Abuse Of Opioids, Acting Commissioner Says, 43 
PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. 550 (Apr. 27, 2015, Bloomberg). 
 26  Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for FY 2015, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,807 (Aug. 1, 2014). 
 27  Id.  
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agency are charged a grossly variable fee.”28 The contrapositive is that an agency 
should not charge a flat fee for providing services with grossly variable costs.  
PDUFA also fails to meet this test. In a survey of all clinical trials providing pivotal 
data used in FDA approvals from 2005-2012, investigators found substantial variance 
in the amount of clinical data submitted for various drugs in terms of size, duration, 
and repetition.29 For example, cardiovascular drugs had on average three times as 
many patients in their clinical trials as dermatological drugs.30 This suggests that the 
amount of data analyzed by the FDA is extremely variable across drugs. In fact, the 
FDA recognizes this variance as impacting its workload, which it admits varies 
“depending on factors such as therapeutic area, . . . amendment submissions, . . . [and] 
complex protocols.”31 Therefore, the FDA charges a flat fee for services that cost the 
agency drastically differing degrees of effort and money, which fails the Capital 
Cities32 standard of assessing agency user fees to reasonably correlate with the costs 
of rendering the service. 
In summary, PDUFA is outside the permissible range of agency discretion. In 
assessing flat user fees not related to the dramatic variations in the services rendered 
to the payees and those services’ costs to the agency, the FDA is overstepping two 31 
U.S.C. § 9701(b) statutory factors. Therefore, regardless of the analytical and 
empirical arguments for possible problematic conflicts of interest that user fees pose 
for the FDA, PDUFA could be challenged on purely legal grounds. An agency simply 
cannot assess a flat user fee for such variable services. In the next Part, I analyze three 
other user fee regimes for similar concerns and extrapolate from their structures 
improvements for PDUFA. 
III. WHAT THE FDA CAN LEARN FROM AIRLINES, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, 
AND PATENTS 
Many federal and state agencies charge user fees to help sustain their operations. 
Unlike PDUFA, some of these fees have been heavily litigated. These disputes provide 
lessons for improving agency user fees schemes to ensure optimal service and 
efficiency. In this Part, I discuss three especially pedagogical user fee mistakes. 
A. The FAA’s Overzealous Overflight 
In 1996, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) sought to collect user fees on 
flights that crossed U.S. airspace but did not land or take off within the country.33 The 
rationale was that without this additional fee, the FAA would only charge for a takeoff 
or landing event, which effectively provided no-cost FAA services to international 
                                                          
 28  Capital Cities Commc'n, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n  Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1135, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). 
 29  Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel 
Therapeutic Agents, 2005-2012, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 368 (2014). 
 30  Id. at 373. 
 31  Id. at 12. 
 32  Capital Cities Commc'n, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n  Comm'n, 554 F.2d at 1138.  
 33  Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213 
(1996). 
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airlines that only traversed through U.S. airspace.34 This overflight user fee was 
quickly struck down by the D.C. Circuit in Asiana Airlines v. FAA, which held that 
these fees were not related to the cost of services provided by the agency, and that user 
“fees must be established in such a way that each flight pays according to the burden 
associated with servicing that flight.”35 Thus, like my legal challenge of PDUFA, the 
FAA failed to consider the costs to the agency in its fee assessment discretion.  
This FAA shortcoming stemmed from its failure to determine an appropriate user 
fee schedule. In estimating user fees, the FAA sought no input from the airlines 
themselves on how much usage there would actually be.36 As a result, the actually 
assessed costs were extremely poor estimates of the real cost of servicing these 
overflights. A contemporary and analogous Canadian overflight user fee plan, which 
had much more rigorous fact-finding, assessed fees at only 1/3 of the American 
prices.37 The lesson here is that industry input of potential costs of an agency service 
is invaluable in ensuring appropriately-priced user fees that reflect the costs of service 
to the agency. 
This lesson can be applied to PDUFA. Because each new drug application contains 
highly variable amounts of clinical data for the FDA to assess,38 the FDA should 
determine an individualized user fee for each submission. In doing so, the FDA can 
directly solicit input from the manufacturer on the costs and workload associated with 
analyzing its clinical trials, so as to appropriately price the cost of the workload for 
the FDA’s analysis of the submitted data. Furthermore, because this assessment is 
individualized, and can even incorporate costs like sponsor-FDA meetings or the need 
for accelerated approvals, these additional fees can be assessed post hoc after a smaller 
initial payment. For instance, with each decision letter – grant or deny – to a drug 
manufacturer, there could be an additional bill for the FDA services rendered. This 
significantly lessens any potential conflicts of interest or perverse incentives, as the 
fees are paid ex post purely for the services rendered, regardless of the outcome 
decision. This also more efficiently allocates funding, as manufacturers only pay for 
the costs directly related to the services received. Finally, this change still ensures 
PDUFA’s revenue stream for the FDA.  
The FAA mistakenly estimated how much overflight usage there would be without 
asking the airlines about actual usage; the FDA should learn from this and not use a 
pre-submissions flat fee as a poor estimate of its service costs. Instead, by assessing 
costs post-decision, the FDA can better gauge service costs via actual usage, and in 
turn better structure PDUFA to lessen its conflicts. 
B. The New York DEC’s Budget Shortfall 
In 1983, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) started 
to collect user fees to regulate air emissions, waste water discharges, hazardous waste 
                                                          
 34  Roy Goldberg, Will it Happen Again? — FAA's Disastrous Prior Experience with User 
Fees, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 37, 38 (2006). 
 35  Asiana Airlines v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 134 F.3d 393, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 36  See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 41. 
 37  Id. at 42. 
 38  See supra Fee Rates, note Error! Bookmark not defined. 
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treatment, and solid waste disposal.39 The triggering event for this was a cutback in 
federal environmental grants, resulting in a huge budget deficit for the DEC.40 Unlike 
the FAA, the NYDEC did try to tailor user fees to the amount of regulatory attention 
a company required.41 However, the fees still created a massive budget shortfall by 
not accounting for agency overhead. The fee schedule overlooked the burden of 
litigating non-meritorious contests of assessed user fees: the DEC charged a company 
the same user fee, proportional to the needed regulatory workload, even as the agency 
absorbed the cost of resolving disputes regarding the amount of user fees to assess.42 
Under the DEC paradigm, there was no information-forcing incentive for industry to 
be candid with the regulators; rather, industry had incentives to dispute all user fee 
amounts because it would not have to pay a higher fee even if it lost the dispute.  
Conversely, in a regime where firms providing faulty or non-meritorious 
information are assessed additional punitive fees, the penalty creates incentives for 
industry to carefully monitor the information provided to an agency. This lesson can 
be incorporated to improve PDUFA. If the current flat user fee regime was tailored 
not only to the required workload, but also based on the outcome of the applications 
and clinical trials, it would incentivize higher-quality drug manufacturer information. 
Under such a proposed regime, any drug applications with sub-standard clinical trial 
performance should be assessed a penalty in addition to the normal user fee. Such a 
regime would efficiently deal with the obvious examples of by-choice bad drug 
applications that waste the FDA’s time. However, more relevant to today’s clinical 
trials,43 by-necessity drug applications that only have one clinical trial (instead of the 
conventional minimum of two trials) or uses dramatically compressed timelines (due 
to circumstances like dire-need drugs with a small trial population) could also be 
assessed a higher-than-normal user fee. In turn, if those drugs are approved, the FDA 
could use that additional revenue to communicate the circumstances of that drug’s 
approval to patients and physicians so that informative due warning is provided. This 
stick would force the drug manufacturers to elect to either provide better clinical 
information and thus greater patient safety, or pay the FDA a penalty so that the agency 
could use the revenue to disseminate caveats about its approval. This proposal also 
still ensures (and may actually increase) the FDA’s revenues.  
The New York DEC mistakenly overlooked the power of regulatory sticks to 
incentivize desired behavior; the FDA should learn this lesson and not passively accept 
low quality clinical trials. Instead, by assessing a higher fee for sub-standard clinical 
data – those by choice or by necessity – the FDA can incentivize higher-quality 
manufacturer practices, which in turn ensures better patient safety. 
                                                          
 39  Declaratory Ruling 72-01 In re Genesee Central School Dist. , N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/legal_protection_pdf/72_01.pdf.  
 40  David P. McCaffrey & Ronald H. Miller, Improving Regulatory Information: New York's 
Transition to Environmental Fees, 1986 PUB. MGMT. FORUM 75, 77. 
 41  Id. at 78. 
 42  Id. at 77. 
 43  See Downing et al., supra note 29. 
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C. Not All User Fees Are Created Equal 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office’s budget is sustained almost 
entirely by user fees.44 Critics argue that such structures set up perverse incentives for 
the USPTO to be trigger-happy about granting patents.45 Professor Wasserman 
explains that  
the fee structure of the PTO is such that fees from patent examinations 
cover less than one-third of the Agency’s cost . . . . In contrast, the post-
allowance [patent maintenance] fees the PTO collects are pure profits – 
these services cost the PTO practically nothing. Thus, the PTO has strong 
financial incentives to grant patents and this incentive systematically 
pushes the Agency’s views on substantive patent law in the patent-
protective direction.46 
Thus, to mitigate this perverse incentive, one recommendation is to restructure the 
PTO user fees so that it is directly proportional to the cost of service to the agency, 
much like the National Cable Television47 and New England Power48 decisions had 
recommended. Therefore, the USPTO has been called upon to realign its fee structure 
so that the fees are paid primarily for the examination, rather than any costless-but-
profitable post-grant maintenance.49 In fact, the European Patent and Trademark 
Office has such a structure and charges almost three times as much as the USPTO for 
examining patent applications.50 
The FDA and PDUFA face a very similar problem in its user fee structure. Of all 
the PDUFA user fees collected in 2013, only 35% are from the submission of a drug 
application.51 The remainder is from either establishment fees – which each 
manufacturer with an active or submitted application pays annually – or product fees 
– which each drug with an active or submitted application pays annually.52 While 
maintenance and surveillance of a marketed drug is obviously an active and costly 
                                                          
 44  GLENN J. MCLOUGHLIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20906, U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION 2 (2014) (USPTO has a 
$3.458 billion budget for 2015, of which $3.024 billion is collected from user fees.). 
 45  Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO's Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand 
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 432 (2011). 
 46  Id.  
 47  Nat’l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1974).  
 48  Federal Power Commission v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
 49  A Glimpse under the Hood: How the USPTO Proposes to Adjust Patent Fees, http://
www.patentdocs.org/2012/03/a-glimpse-under-the-hood-how-the-uspto-proposes-to-adjust-
patent-fees-.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2016). 
 50  Wasserman, supra note 45.  
 51  USER FEE COLLECTIONS, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManuals
Forms/Reports/UserFeeReports/FinancialReports/PDUFA/UCM398248.pdf  (last visited Mar. 
26, 2016). 
 52  FY 2013 PDUFA FINANCIAL REPORT, FDA, at 5, available at: http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/FinancialReports/PD
UFA/UCM398248.pdf (last accessed Feb. 25, 2015). 
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endeavor (much more so than the maintenance of a patent), this distortion in FDA fee 
collection still creates the possibility for perverse incentives. If the FDA is collecting 
the majority of its fees from maintaining drug approvals, what is to prevent it from 
taking a USPTO-like permissive attitude during the drug approval process? Moreover, 
the FDA already takes a rather passive role in post-approval market surveillance,53 
which lessens the justification for collecting the majority of user fees under such a 
purported maintenance purpose. 
Therefore, as a third suggestion for improving PDUFA, the user fee structure 
should be adjusted to reduce incentives for the FDA to be overly permissive during 
drug approvals. To counteract allegations of agency capture from user fee funding, the 
majority of user fees should be collected for the drug application examination process 
itself, and not for anything post-approval. Even at the expense of over-collecting for 
application examination and having to redistribute these fees for other FDA purposes 
(such as overhead or post-market surveillance), the FDA should eliminate any 
systematic opportunities to profit from granted approvals. In essence, this conflict of 
interest is at the heart of PDUFA critics’ arguments, and an appropriate user fee 
structure could go a long way to reassure such critics while still sustaining fee revenues 
from manufacturers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
FDA Commissioner Hamburg has pointedly stated that the PDUFA user fees are 
not a quid pro quo.54 Perhaps, in her mind, that seems to be the strongest 
counterargument to many critics’ arguments about PDUFA’s conflicts of interests. 
However, from a purely legal perspective, agency user fees need to be quid pro quo! 
31 U.S.C. § 9701(a), National Cable Television55, New England Power56, and Capital 
Cities Communications57 all explicitly hold that a federal agency’s assessment of fees 
need to be tailored to the value of the services received and to the cost of the service 
to the agency. With so much variance among new drug applications in terms of 
services-needed and approval timelines, a flat user fee simply is not appropriate. 
Rather, working within permissible agency fee discretion can actually decrease 
                                                          
 53  See, e.g., Leslie Pray & Sally Robinson, Rapporteurs, Forum on Drug Discovery, 
Development, and Translation, in CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, 
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 62-63 (2007)  
At the time of approval, the FDA often negotiates hurriedly with a company to design 
a Phase IV study. While the company may have agreed to conduct the study prior to 
approval, the FDA has few options for ensuring that it actually meets that commitment 
once the drug is on the market. Because these studies may be negotiated quickly at the 
last moment, they [also] can be poorly designed. As a result, a company may have 
difficulty gaining approval for such a study from an institutional review board (IRB) or 
enrolling subjects, or may conduct the study but end up with meaningless results. Id. 
 54  Margaret A. Hamburg, FDA Commissioner, Address at the Yale Law School FDA Law 
class (Apr. 22, 2015). 
 55  Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n  Comm'n, 415 U.S. 336, 341-42 
(1974). 
 56  Fed. Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). 
 57  Capital Cities Comm'n, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n  Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1135, 1137-38 (Fed. 
Cir. 1976). 
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perceived conflicts of interest. For example, charging a reduced flat fee upfront and 
assessing additional cost-of-service fees post-decision mitigates concerns about fees 
impacting approval decisions, while also achieving cost tailoring. Similarly, 
penalizing sub-standard clinical data serves an information-forcing purpose without 
jeopardizing revenue. These structural changes do much more to alleviate conflicts 
while sustaining revenues than denying fee tailoring altogether. And most importantly, 
such user fee tailoring would actually make PDUFA legal. 
 
